Majandusteaduskonna teadusseminar "Can one-shot experimental games measure social norms and preferences?" 12.detsembril
“Seminar of the Economics Departments at TSEBA” on Wednesday 12. December, 16:00-17:00 in room X-417.
The seminar is held in English.
Michiru Nagatsu, TSEBA, will present his recent paper:
Can one-shot experimental games measure social norms and preferences?
Abstract: People do not behave strictly so as to maximize monetary payoffs in experimental games such as Public Goods and Ultimatum games. To explain this ‘anomaly’, behavioural economists have proposed so-called social preference models that try to capture other-regarding preferences (altruism, inequity aversion, reciprocity, etc.) as additional arguments of players’ utility functions. However, none of the proposed model has successfully explained data across different games. I give a proper diagnosis to this situation by examining Woodward’s (2008) methodological critique of the social preference approach. I argue that the problem lies not in external validity as Woodward argues, but internal validity of those experiments. Specifically, I defend the one-shot design as a useful paradigm as long as it is internally valid.
The presentation will last approximately 45 minutes followed by 15 minutes of discussion, in total one hour.
Everyone is welcome! Questions regarding the seminar can be addressed to Liis Saks, liis dot saks at ttu dot ee.